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Minimum Alcohol Pricing in Scotch Whisky 
Association v Lord Advocate 
Angus MacCulloch* 
The Alcohol (Minimum Pricing) (Scotland) Act 2012 empowers the Scottish Ministers, by 
Order, to set a Minimum Price per Unit of alcohol (MPU).  A draft Order setting the MPU at 
£0.501 was immediately challenged by the Scotch Whisky Association2 on the basis that it 
would be contrary to EU law as a restriction on the free movement of goods. The Scottish 
Government justified the measure as being designed to protect public health. In this piece I 
will highlight some of the key free movement issues raised by the case. 
A. THE JUDGMENT OF THE OUTER HOUSE 
The judgment focuses on whether the MPU can be justified. It spends no time discussing 
how the MPU Order falls within the terms of the prohibition of quantitative restrictions on 
trade in Art 34 TFEU. Both parties agreed that the MPU Order was a ‘measure having 
equivalent effect’ to a quantitative restriction. This followed an EU Commission Opinion on 
the compatibility of the draft Order with EU law after its notification under the Technical 
Standards Directive.3 The Commission notes that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has 
ruled that measures which fix retail prices fall within the prohibition of quantitative 
restrictions on imports if they are set at such a level that imported products are placed at a 
disadvantage when compared to identical domestic products.4 The Commission argues that 
minimum prices do not take into account the costs of production, and therefore 
disadvantage imported products that have lower production costs than their domestic 
rivals.5 The Commission also argues the measure would have greater impact on new 
entrants to the market. This echoes the CJEU’s position in Gourmet International.6 In the 
case of MPU the argument would be that novel products from other Member States would 
be unable to use pricing promotions, below the MPU, to break into the UK market.  
As these issues were not contested, the legal assertions made by the Commission in 
their Opinion were not scrutinised. However, the Commission Opinion is less than 
convincing. It was not formally published or subject to any transparent debate or challenge, 
and yet it appears to have been decisive. If the Commission wishes to play a role in 
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developing public policy it should surely do so in a much more transparent and accountable 
fashion. 
The Scottish Government sought to justify the MPU Order as reducing the harm to 
public health and public disorder caused by problematic alcohol consumption.7 The measure 
was designed to target harmful and hazardous drinkers and reduce their consumption. It 
argued that the Parliament had considered alternate measures, but had concluded that 
‘none of the alternatives suggested would be suitable and appropriate, or as effective, in 
achieving the aims’.8 The central issue was therefore the proportionality of the measure 
chosen – was there a measure less restrictive of trade which could also protect health and 
prevent disorder? 
(1) Proportionality 
The petitioners argued that less restrictive measures were possible. Their main suggestion 
was a ‘combination of increases in excise duty and bans on below duty plus vat sales, or 
below cost plus vat sales’.9 They also argued it would be wrong to allow the Scottish 
Parliament any ‘margin of appreciation’ in relation to the measure.10  
The approach of Lord Doherty in the Outer House focused on proportionality, but uses the 
‘objective justification’ test from Trailers,11 rather than the more traditional ‘necessity’ test 
from Cassis,12 stating:  
‘The crucial question is whether there is objective justification for the measures which 
are under attack’.13 
There has been much academic comment on the importance of the distinct approaches 
taken by the Court in the Cassis/Keck line of cases on one hand and the Trailers approach on 
the other.14 Lord Doherty was not troubled by the potential differences between the two 
tests; he clearly treats them as equivalent.15 There may be a simple domestic explanation 
for the preference: it was the approach previously adopted by the Extra Division in Sinclair 
Collis v Lord Advocate.16 However, since Lord Doherty’ judgment the CJEU appears to have 
regularised the Trailers approach in several of its cases; notably Commission v Poland,17 
Commission v Lithuania,18 and Commission v Spain.19 
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(a) A Margin of Appreciation? 
The use of the Trailers test also gave Lord Doherty opportunity to discuss the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ available to a Member State when adopting measures. The idea of ‘margin of 
appreciation’ is commonly associated with human rights jurisprudence but it has a long 
history of use in EU law.20 The harmonisation goal of the EU could result in a very limited 
application of any margin of appreciation, but the EU has always had to tread an ‘awkward 
line’ between a common European approach while respecting difference and divergence 
between Member States.21 As Sweeney puts it, the margin of appreciation, ‘allows the 
impulses of European commonality and national particularism visibly to interact but never 
fully to defeat each other’.22 The margin of appreciation afforded to EU Member States is 
defined, and limited, through the operation of the proportionality principle. In this context 
we are dealing with a common European aim, the protection of health, but the Scottish 
Parliament must be given the necessary margin to address that aim within the 
circumstances and cultural norms of Scots society. Where there is a strong European 
consensus, and a common culture across the EU, it is not necessary to have a wide margin, 
and proportionality could be operated more strictly. But that is not the situation with the 
relationship between health and alcohol consumption.23 Lord Doherty considered the 
margin of appreciation to be part of the consideration of proportionality.24  
(b) The Aim of the Measure 
Lord Doherty identified that the aim of MPU was the ‘reduction of alcohol consumption, but 
in particular the reduction of such consumption by hazardous and harmful drinkers’.25 He 
also noted that Scottish Ministers were ‘seeking to strike a reasonable balance between, on 
the one hand, public health and social benefits, and, on the other, intervention in the 
market’.26 Perhaps his most important conclusion was that: ‘[t]he major problem is 
excessive consumption of cheap alcohol’.27 This finding is vital for the rest of the case. As 
the aim of the measure is narrowly defined, and is defined in the context of an identified 
problem in Scotland, it centres the rest of the proportionality analysis in that context. By 
accepting the measure has a narrow purpose Lord Doherty shifted the subsequent analysis 
into a similarly narrow frame. 
The detailed consideration of the proportionality of the measure was split into three 
sections: first, the legitimacy of the aim; second, the appropriateness of the aim; and, 
finally, the necessity of the measure. The first of these was dealt with swiftly – there was no 
disagreement that serious health problems stemmed from alcohol consumption in Scotland. 
Under the second heading there was disagreement. The petitioners suggested that many 
‘harmful and hazardous’ drinkers were in higher income groups and would be unaffected by 
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the measure. That argument was rejected by Lord Doherty on the basis of the evidence 
before Parliament. The most important section of the judgment was therefore devoted to 
whether the measure was ‘necessary’.  
(c) The Necessity of the Measure 
The imposition of MPU would be disproportionate if its aim could be achieved equally well 
by a less restrictive measure. The petitioner advocated the EU Commission’s preferred 
solution: the increase of general excise duties on all alcohol. The Outer House examined the 
proportionality question by requiring the parties to discharge a series of alternating 
evidential burdens. 
The first key finding was that an increase in general excise duty would be less restrictive 
of trade than MPU. The petitioners made this assertion and the respondents challenged it 
by suggesting that the impact of the change may be ‘more complicated and less predictable’ 
than suggested.28 That response was considered to be insufficient to displace the 
petitioner’s argument. However, it is unsatisfactory that a key point was not more fully 
argued. I suggest that such a rise would be far more restrictive of trade, in that it would 
affect all alcohol products in the UK, whereas MPU would affect only those priced below the 
MPU floor. Lord Doherty makes this very point about a general rise in excise duty: 
‘[the] average increase in the price of alcohol would have to be significantly greater 
than under minimum pricing (in order to achieve increases in price for the cheapest 
products of the same order as under minimum pricing). Moderate drinkers and the on-
trade would be affected more’.29  
The next issue therefore became  critical: ‘If the alternative measures would not be just as 
effective as minimum pricing in achieving the legitimate aims, minimum pricing would be 
necessary and proportionate’.30 After reviewing the evidence presented in in the Bill’s 
Impact Assessment31 and before the Scottish Parliament, Lord Doherty noted that general 
excise duties are constrained by EU law to have single rates for beverages within a range of 
alcohol strength. It is therefore impossible for rates to change directly in relation to alcohol 
content. He concluded that: 
‘A system which results in higher prices for higher strength alcohol appears to be more 
consistent with the legitimate aims than one which will tend to result in similar prices 
for alcohol of significantly different strengths … Under minimum pricing alcohol which is 
cheap relative to strength can be targeted. The directives preclude excise duty being 
used in that way.’32 
The ability of MPU to target lower priced alcohol was therefore pivotal. General duty 
increases would have an impact on general alcohol consumption. Lord Doherty took the 
intention of the measures not to be to lower general consumption, but to target the harm of 
lower priced alcohol: 
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‘In my opinion there is inherent in the Act and the proposed Order a judgment as to the 
level of protection of health and life the measures are designed to achieve. There is also 
a judgment that the best way of maximising reductions in sales, consumption and harm 
is to focus price increases on cheaper alcohol’.33  
For me the most important feature of the analysis is not the restrictiveness of the measure 
itself; it is the narrow definition of the measure’s aim. As the measure adopted by the 
Scottish Parliament was narrowly defined, addressing a particular aim, and the measure – 
although it was restrictive – was an effective means of achieving that aim, it was therefore 
proportionate. The fact that a ‘less restrictive’ alternative existed was not relevant when it 
was not seen as effective; in that it did not address the aim. This brings us back to the 
‘margin of appreciation’ which is part of proportionality. The Scottish Parliament have a 
‘margin’ to decide, after examining the societal and cultural circumstances within Scotland, 
which legitimate aim they wish to address. If they take care to ensure that they specifically 
delineate that aim, and then, most importantly, identify a measure well suited to achieving 
it, it makes it very difficult to challenge the proportionality of that measure. The problem 
with the alternate measure was that it was more general and therefore was not able to be 
targeted. If the aim defined by the Scottish Parliament was less specific it would have given 
greater scope for challengers to put forward more convincing alternatives.  
It is difficult for a challenger to suggest that the Member State has selected the ‘wrong’ 
aim, or the level of protection desired is too high. There are classic cases, like Sandoz34 and 
Danish Bottles,35 where it can be argued that the CJEU overturned measures where the 
legitimacy of the aim was itself at issue, but in this case the evidence presented to the 
Scottish Parliament was comprehensive and convincing. Once it was accepted that the 
measure was targeted at protecting the heath of ‘harmful and hazardous’ drinkers, who 
tended to consume low cost/high alcohol products, the challengers’ task was made much 
more difficult. In order to defend their restrictive policy the Scottish Government played the 
game well: they identified a real issue of concern, defined it narrowly, and identified an 
evidence based measure to specifically address it.36 In reality the ‘margin of appreciation’ 
for Member States does not leave a ‘grey area’ in which they may adopt broad-based 
policies – it allows them to adopt policy within a broad area, but once they adopt a policy, to 
limit the potential for successful challenge, they must be clear and specific about its 
implementation. 
B. CONCLUSIONS 
The ‘margin of appreciation’ afforded to the Scottish Parliament was central to the 
Outer House’s judgment. The application of the proportionality test does not mean that 
there is a common ‘one size fits all’ approach across the EU. Member States must be able to 
deal with the diverse problems they face. The Scottish Parliament had identified a particular 
issue on the basis of strong public health evidence. It was therefore right that the legislature 
was given scope to identify and prioritise a problem for action without interference from EU 
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trade law. But it was also correct that EU law was available to challenge the implementation 
of that policy to ensure it respected, as far as was possible, the principles of free movement. 
Most legal scrutiny is given to the operation of the second part of the proportionality 
principle, but the SWA case indicates the importance of clearly identifying the legislative 
rationale. If the legislator carefully considers the rationale for their action, and then targets 
their measure at a clear and defined problem, they can significantly narrow the frame of 
reference of any subsequent challenge. By focusing their policy on ‘harmful and hazardous’ 
drinkers the Scottish Parliament successfully framed the issue and effectively limited the 
subsequent application of the proportionality test. 
This will not be the last time the UK courts have an opportunity to consider the legality 
of minimum alcohol pricing. There is an ongoing appeal against the Outer House judgment, 
and any attempt to extend the policy to other parts of the UK will also, no doubt, be subject 
to legal challenge. However, on this first showing the Scottish Parliament appears to have 
put in place a measure that stands up well to scrutiny. 
 
